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Introduction 
In the last two decades substantial funds have been channel-
led into rural financial markets in low income countries (LIC) to 
strengthen financial markets [Von Pischke and Adams]. Yet, in 
most of these countries, the formal financial institutions are 
still far from being self-sustaining and viable and a large 
segment of the population is still dependent on informal loansll. 
Two transactions-costs explanations have been offered for 
the limited use of formal rural credit in LICs: one focuses on 
lender's costs and the other on borrower's costs. Gonzalez-Vega 
developed a model that shows how concessionary interest rates on 
loans discourage formal lenders from lending to the rural poor, 
especially when lenders incur relatively high transactions costs 
for rural lending~/. Adams and Nehman show that excessive total 
costs of borrowing from formal institutions due to high borrower 
transactions costs may also discourage many rural borrowers from 
using formal sources of credit~!. Ladman added to this by 
developing a model to show that borrower transactions costs 
result chiefly from the rationin~ mechanism employed by formal 
lenders who face high transactions costs of lending but are 
unable to cover these costs due to limitations set by the 
financial authority in the form of fixed, concessionary lending 
rates. 
With controlled interest rates, lenders engage in implicit 
price setting that involves differential treatment of loan 
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applicants in terms of loan allocation, disbursement monitoring, 
and supervision. This implicit price setting procedure enables 
the lenders to exclude or ration unwanted clients. The acti-
vities involved in the screening mechanism lead to increased 
transactions costs for both borrowers and lenders. In addition, 
the intermediary also transfers as much of the burden as possible 
of his own transactions costs to the borrowers, further raising 
the total costs of borrowing. Cuevas built a model to show that 
the spread between the total borrowing cost and the explicit 
interest cost reflects the value of the implicit charges. He 
then estimated a borrowers' transactions costs function to show 
the trade-off between the controlled (explicit) interest rate and 
transactions costs arising from the rationing activities of the 
lenders. 
This paper builds on this earlier work and compares the 
transactions costs of borrowing from formal and informal sources 
in Bangladesh to show that borrower transaction costs are higher 
in the formal market than in the informal market. It will also 
be shown that a relevant measure of the costs of credit to the 
borrowers is the effective cost of amount lentil. It will then 
be shown that the effective cost of formal credit is higher than 
that of informal loans. Data from a 1981 survey of rural 
households in 12 vi 1 lages in Bangladesh are used to estimate 
transaction costs of borrowing and the resulting effective costs 
of loans from both formal and informal lenders (Ahmed). 
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The Model 
Borrower costs of credit (BC) include not only nominal 
interest costs (NI) but also borrower transaction costs (TC). 
Adams and Nehman defined the "borrower's price of credit" in 
terms of real net costs of the loan by including the changes in 
purchasing power (AP) over the loan period as: 
[ 1] BC = NI + TC - AP. 
In a regime of fixed, concessionary lending rates, the share of 
transaction costs 
very high in the 
Shahjahan). 
in total borrowing costs has been found to be 
formal market [Ahmed, Alam, Cuevas, Nehman, 
An important feature of borrower transactions costs is that 
they are invariably incurred prior to and at the time of obtain-
ing the loan. Therefore, instead of a simple addition to the 
interest cost of funds as used by Adams and Nehman, Alam, Cuevas, 
and others, these transaction costs should be discounted from the 
loan amount (L) to get a net value of the incremental funds 
received by the borrower. The difference between the total 
repayment that is due at maturity and the net addition of funds 
from the loan proceeds will give a more accurate measure of the 
total absolute costs of borrowing a given amount of net usable 
funds. This total cost, expressed as a percent of the net loan 
received, can be defined as the annualized effective cost of the 
loan. This effective cost (E) per unit of time can be calculated 
as: 
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(2) E = (1 + r).!l...,lL/(L-TC) - 1 where: r is the interest 
rate; and n is the 
loan term in years~/. 
For borrowers with positive transaction costs, the effective cost 
will, therefore, be higher than the explicit interest cost of the 
loan. Also, it can be shown that for a given loan size and fixed 
interest rate, the effective cost increases with the transactions 
costs of borrowing. Differentiating equation (2) partially with 
respect to TC gives: 
(3) oE/ oTC = [(l+r)/n~L/(L-TC)n+l > 0 
Thus borrowers incurring high transaction costs of borrowing will 
incur high effective costs of credit. 
Effective Costs of Credit in Bangladesh 
Costs of credit were calculated from data obtained through a 
survey of a rural credit market in Bangladesh. The survey area 
was Raipura Upazilla (similar to a county) in the old Dhaka 
District (now in Narsingdhi District). A stratified two-stage 
sampling method was designed for the survey [Cochran, Deming). 
Four unions (similar to precincts) were selected in the first 
stage with a probability equal to the number of households in the 
villages. The households were then divided into two strata: 
those who borrowed from the institutional lender, Bangladesh 
Krishi Bank (BKB), and those who did not borrow from the BKB, 
Raipura Branch was obtained from the list of BKB borrowers. The 
remaining households in each primary unit formed the population 
for the sample of households who did not borrow from BKB. A 
total of one hundred and twenty-two heads of households were 
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interviewed for the study, divided equally between those who 
borrowed from the BKB and those who did not. 
In order to reduce the likelihood of inaccurate recall by 
the interviewees, questions were restricted to activities in the 
current year only and to infrequent events that are expected to 
be easy to remember&/. Most information regarding loans from the 
BKB was confirmed by information provided by the bank. Since the 
chances of forgetting transaction costs are minimal and the 
information on the loans was accurate, it was assumed that other 
information provided was also reasonably accurate. Loans from 
the informal sources, however, were difficult to double-check. 
As these loans had very little transaction costs, the need for 
checking was minimizedll. 
In order to avoid questions about amounts spent directly on 
bribes or gratuities, which many borrowers might feel uncomfor-
table disclosing, borrowers were asked to report total cash 
expenditures 
component of 
net of interest payments. Hence the total cash 
transactions costs includes such diverse items as 
travel expense, food and entertainment expenses, bribes, and 
losses incurred when borrowers sold in-kind credit (generally 
fertilizer) to authorized dealers in exchange for cash. Inf or-
mation on the opportunity cost of time associated with processing 
and obtaining the loan was determined by estimating the value of 
time the borrower spent away from his work. Care was taken to 
exclude visits to town not associated with the loan. The cost of 
each work-day was calculated from the prevailing market wage rate 
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for male workers in the borrower's profession in that village~/. 
In the case of in-kind loans from informal sources, the market 
value of the commodity at the time of the loan transaction was 
used to determine the market value of the loan; similarly, if the 
repayment was in-kind, then the market value of the commodity (or 
service) at the time of repayment was used. In case the loan had 
not yet matured, the market value of the repayment was calculated 
in terms of market prices prevailing during the interview period. 
Of the sixty-one households that did not borrow from the 
BKB, Raipura Branch, thirty-six (59 percent) obtained funds from 
informal sources (including friends and relatives) some of them 
obtaining multiple loans. However, twenty-five (42 percent) did 
not borrow any funds at all. During the period of study (1980-
81), the interest rate on most formal agricultural loans was set 
at a 12 percent nominal rate (a negative 3 percent real rate) by 
the Bangladesh Bankg/. Ignoring transactions costs, there should 
be a great demand for funds at negative real interest rates 
because of the associated income transfer. It is likely that the 
effect of this low interest rate ceiling on institutional credit 
is to increase non-interest means of credit rationing by the 
formal lending institutions. At the same time, interest rates in 
the informal markets are free to clear the market, and informal 
lenders are not forced to depend on a non-interest rationing 
mechanism. Nominal interest rates on informal loans for the 
sample averaged 42 percent (a 23 percent real rate) with some 
7 
small short-term loans carrying rates as high as 120 percent 
annually. 
Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of total trans-
action costs of borrowing from the BKB by major components: cash 
costs, and cost of work-days lost. The bottom part of the table 
shows the frequency distribution of transaction costs of bor-
rowing from the informal sources. It can be seen that the 
majority of borrowers from BKB incurred costs much above the 
average transactions costs in the informal market. About 60 
percent of BKB borrowers incurred cash costs over Taka 50, and in 
terms of the opportunity cost of lost work time, about 70 percent 
incurred costs over Taka 50. Only 3.4 percent of the borrowers 
from the informal lenders had cash costs over Taka 50 and, 
considering their opportunity cost of time, only 7 percent 
incurred costs over 50 TakalQ/. 
Table 2 shows the average loan transactions cost by the 
component costs for various loan size groups. Al though total 
transact ion costs are high for large loan sizes, the cost per 
unit of money borrowed decreases with loan size. Average cash 
transaction costs increase from Taka 52 for the small loans of 
Taka 500 or less to Taka 370 for the large loans of over Taka 
3, 000. The average for the sample is Taka 141. Similarly, the 
average cost of work days lost increases with loan size from Taka 
58 for small loans to Taka 161 for large loans. The average for 
the sample is Taka 132. The average transactions costs for BKB 
borrowers ranges from Taka 110 for the small borrowers to Taka 
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Table 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS BY TRANSACTIONS COSTS OF BORROWING 
Account of 
Transaction Travel & Misc. Cost 01212ortunity Cost ** Total Tr. Cost 
Costs Number of Number of Number of 
(Takas)* Cases ( % ) Cases ( % ) Cases ( % ) 
BORROWERS FROM THE BKB 
0 50 24 (39) 18 (30) 9 ( 15) 
51 - 100 14 ( 2 3) 16 (26) 8 ( 13) 
101 - 200 15 (25) 15 (25) 13 ( 21) 
201 - 300 3 ( 5 ) 10 ( 16) 11 ( 18) 
Above 300 5 ( 8) 2 ( 3 ) 20 (33) 
Total 61 (100) 61 (100) 61 (100) 
BORROWERS FROM INFORMAL LENDERS*** 
0 50 40 (98) 38 (93) 38 (93) 
51 - 100 2 ( 5 ) 1 ( 2) 
101 - 200 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2) 1 ( 2) 
201 - 300 2 ( 2 ) 
Above 300 
Total 41 (100) 41 (100) 41 
(100) 
* US$1 =Bangladesh Taka 16.69 in 1980-81. 
** Opportunity cost of workdays lost was calculated as: Cost = D x Y; 
where D is the number of days (or parts thereof) actually spent away 
from work in connection with the loan, and Y is the estimated daily 
income foregone by the farmer during that period. 
*** Due to multiple loans there are a total of 41 loans for 36 borrowers. 
US$1 =Bangladesh Taka 16.69 in 1980-81. 
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Table 2 
AVERAGE TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND ANNUALIZED EFFECTIVE COSTS 
Average 
Travel Average Ratio 
Size of No. & Misc. Opportunity Trans. of TC Nomina l 
Loans of Costs Costs Costs(TC) to Loan Effective 
(Takas)* Cases (Takas) (Takas) (Takas) ( % ) Cost ( % ) 
BORROWERS FROM THE BKB 
0 -500 5 52 58 110 29 146 
501 -1000 25 94 126 220 28 169 
1001 -3000 26 174 129 276 18 59 
Above 3000 5 370 161 531 07 16 
Sample 61 141 132 272 22 108 
BORROWERS FROM THE INFORMAL LENDERS ** 
0 500 25 2 2 7 3 57 
501 - 1000 3 3 20 23 3 8 6 
1001 - 3000 6 2 57 58 4 63 
Above 3000 7 19 16 35 1 24 
Sample 41 5 16 21 2 5 4 
* US$1 = Bangladesh Taka 16.69 in 1980-81. 
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531 for the large borrowers, while the average for the sample is 
Taka 272. However, as expected, transactions costs as a per-
centage of loan value decreases with loan size from 29% for the 
small loans to 7% for the large loans with an average of 22% for 
the sample. Except for the large loans over Taka 2, 000, the 
transactions costs per Taka of loan is higher than the interest 
costs of 12 percent. The declining ratio of transaction costs to 
loan size shows that large borrowers are not as affected by 
transaction costs as are small borrowers. Thus the rationing 
mechanism imposes additional costs mostly on the small borrowers 
who are most likely to be poor and for whom the concessionary 
interest rates were designedl1/. 
In the case of the sample of informal borrowers, the average 
transaction costs from informal sources are not only low, but 
they are a relatively insignificant proportion of the loan size. 
In the informal market, average cash transaction costs increase 
with loan size but the range is not as wide in absolute value as 
in the formal market. The sample average is Taka 5 which is only 
4% of the loan cost in the formal market. Again, the sample 
average opportunity cost of time is Taka 16 which is only 12% of 
the cost in the BKB sample. Average transactions costs are Taka 
7 for small loans and rise to Taka 35 for the large loans over 
Taka 3,000, while the sample average is 21 Takall/. Conse-
quently, the ratio of transactions costs to loan size is much 
lower than for the BKB loan sample. The ratio of transactions 
costs to loan size shows that the credit disbursement mechanism 
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and the loan screening process do not impose significant addi-
tional costs on the borrowers. Perhaps, the transactions costs 
incurred by lenders in the loan screening process are inter-
nalized in the explicit interest rate charged. 
The last column in Table 2 shows the nominal effective costs 
of credit for different loan sizes in the two markets. As 
expected, the nominal effective cost decreases as the size of 
loan increases. Comparing the effective rates in the two 
markets, we find that for loans of Taka 1,000 or less the 
effective cost of 169% is highest in the formal market, while for 
loans above Taka 3,000 the effective cost of 16% is lowest in the 
formal market. In fact, for loans over Taka 1,000, the effective 
costs in the formal market are lower than in the informal market. 
However, for loans of Taka 1,000 or less, the effective costs in 
the formal market are much higher than in the informal market. 
The average effective cost for the sample is about 108 percent in 
the formal market, which is twice the average effective cost of 
54 percent in the informal market. One would have to assume that 
those BKB clients who borrowed at these prohibitive costs were 
looking at the early costs as 'sunk costs', or were planning to 
default on the loan. This comparison suggests that small 
borrowers would patronize the relatively less expensive informal 
market, while the large borrowers should prefer to seek the 
cheaper formal credit. 
Table 3 shows the results of Student's T-tests comparing 




T-tests comparing cases of samples of BKBN and non-BKB borrowers.* 
Testing the hypothesis (HO) that the population means of the two samples are 
the same for the respective variables. (Monetary values denominated in Takas.) 
Borrower Standard 
Variable Sample Mean Error T-Value* DF Remark 
Transaction BKB 272 .0 36.67 6.74 64.34 Reject 
Costs (Total) non-BKB 20.5 7.02 Ho 
Tr. Cost as BKB 21. 7 2.29 8.04 79 . 83 Reject 
Percent of non-BKB 2.4 0.74 Ho 
Loan 
Effective BKN 107.7 18.57 2.55 87.89 Reject 
Cost (%) non-BKB 54.2 9.81 Ho 
Nominal 
*Because of unequal variances, the t-values are approximate values. 
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formal and informal markets in the sample survey. The hypothesis 
is tested that the transaction costs and the annualized effective 
costs are the same in both markets. The T-scores for the 
different variables tested showed that the samples are from 
different populations, i.e. transaction costs and the effective 
costs are significantly different in the two populations, and 
that they are higher in the formal (bank) market than in the 
informal marketl3/. 
Conclusion 
The data used in this study are from a small sample in only 
one country. This limits the ability to draw generalizations 
about problems of access to rural formal credit in all low income 
countries. The results, nonetheless, are suggestive and help to 
clarify the impact of transaction costs on credit demand, as 
stressed by Adams and Nehman. The results of the sample survey 
also lends support to the views and explanations of Gonzalez-
Vega. The non-interest rationing mechanism of the formal lenders 
has resulted in the small, poor borrowers being rationed out of 
the formal market. This allows the large, rich borrowers, who 
incur relatively small transactions costs, to take advantage of 
the low, subsidized interest rates. The income transfers via 
the negative real interest rates, therefore, accrue mainly to 
these large borrowers. On the other hand, the informal sources 
provide a much needed alternative to the small borrowers. 
By measuring costs in terms of effective borrowing costs, 
one can more clearly identify the reasons for the limited use of 
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formal loans in the rural sector, particularly by the small, poor 
borrowers. The demand for credit, defined as a function of the 
marginal borrowing costs, follows the normal downward slope with 
respect to effective borrowing costs. Thus a major policy 
conclusion evolving from this study is to encourage financial 
innovations and policies that will lower the effective borrowing 
costs to non-preferred borrowers. Innovations should be aimed at 
reducing the transaction costs incurred in rural financial 
transactions, and policies should be directed at liberalization 
of the market mechanisms that determine the equilibrium interest 
rates. 
jj Formal financial 
and other nonbank 




institutions include banks, cooperatives 
financial organizations that are formally 
financial authority to operate as finan-
~/ Transactions costs of lending include expenses incurred by 
the lender to service the loans, and costs related to the 
default risks. 
~/ Total borrowing costs include the interest costs as well as 
non-interest transactions costs incurred by the borrower in 
connection with the loans net of any transfer income due to 
inflation [Adams and Nehman]. Transactions costs of 
borrowing can be classified into two categories: (a) 
Explicit cash costs that include expenditure on travel, 
entertainment, bribes and gratuities, forced purchase of 
other lender services and/or products, and other expenses 
connected with requirements imposed by the lender; and (b) 
Implicit or opportunity cost of time spent in applying for 
and obtaining the loan, i.e. the opportunity cost of lost 
work-time [Ahmed]. 
!/ The effective cost is the annualized interest payment 
measured as a ratio of the actual usable funds borrowed. 
§_/ If the interest rate r is defined as the nominal interest 
rate, then E is the nominal effective cost. This can be 
converted into real terms by calculating the real interest 
0 0 
rate on the loan, rr = (r-p)/(l+p) and using it in place of 
0 
r in the equation to get the real effective cost; where p is 
the yearly inflation rate. When 0 < n < 1 (i.e. less than 1 
year) then: E = [L(l + r,n)/(l - TC) - l](l/n). 
§_/ Problems of recall are mostly associated with consumption 
expenditures. Records of such expenditures are rarely kept. 
With the length of recall, memory decay of expenditure 
estimates is fairly common in low income countries [Lynch]. 
However, one is more likely to remember unusual expenses on 
such items as bribes and entertainment to get a loan. 
]./ The only reliable control information is that provided by 
other surveys. The data on informal markets in this survey 
is consistent with those of several other studies such as 
Shahjahan, Quasem et al, and Chaudhury and Gafoor. 
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~/ Most bank loans in the survey were taken between October and 
December of 1980, but some were taken as late as March 1981. 
The period between August and November is usually the 
harvest period. The jute harvest is usually in August-
September, and the harvest for Aman paddy is more important 
than that during other periods. The interviews were 
conducted during the weeding and post-sowing period. Real 
wages of agricultural labor in Bangladesh, in fact, have 
been following a decreasing trend since 1968-69 [Khan]. So 
after accounting for the effect of inflation, it can be 
reasonably assumed that the nominal wage rate prevailing in 
the area during the interview period would not be very 
different from the nominal rate prevailing at the time of 
taking the loan. 
g; The inflation rate was 15% during 1980-81, and the exchange 
rate for US$ 1 was Taka 16.69 during the period [Economic 
Trends, vol. VI, no. 2, 1981]. 
1.Q/ There was one case of an informal interest bearing loan 
where the estimate for the opportunity cost of time seems 
unusually high compared to rest of the sample. Sample 
averages without this case are reported below. 
111 In most cases, the amount of the loan approved 
tional to the value of the collateral provided. 
it is appropriate to assume that small borrowers 




g; If we exc 1 ude the case of one informal borrower with an 
unusually high cost of lost work-time, then the sample 
average cost of workdays lost becomes Taka 11, while the 
sample average transaction costs decreases to Taka 16. As a 
result, the sample average ratio of transaction costs to 
loan size falls 2%. 
]di The t-statistics reported are approximate values for samples 
with unequal variances. 
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